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Fuzzy Identity-Based Data Integrity Auditing for
Reliable Cloud Storage Systems
Yannan Li, Yong Yu∗, Geyong Min, Willy Susilo, Jianbing Ni and Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo
Abstract—As a core security issue in reliable cloud storage, data integrity has received much attention. Data auditing protocols enable
a verifier to efficiently check the integrity of the outsourced data without downloading the data. A key research challenge associated
with existing designs of data auditing protocols is the complexity in key management. In this paper, we seek to address the complex
key management challenge in cloud data integrity checking by introducing fuzzy identity-based auditing-the first in such an approach,
to the best of our knowledge. More specifically, we present the primitive of fuzzy identity-based data auditing, where a user’s identity
can be viewed as a set of descriptive attributes. We formalize the system model and the security model for this new primitive. We then
present a concrete construction of fuzzy identity-based auditing protocol by utilizing biometrics as the fuzzy identity. The new protocol
offers the property of error-tolerance, namely, it binds private key to one identity which can be used to verify the correctness of a
response generated with another identity, if and only if both identities are sufficiently close. We prove the security of our protocol based
on the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption and the discrete logarithm assumption in the selective-ID security model. Finally, we
develop a prototype implementation of the protocol which demonstrates the practicality of the proposal.
Index Terms—Cloud Storage, Data Integrity, Biometric-based Identity, Threshold Secret Sharing.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
B IG data is eliciting attention from the academia as wellas the industry. Over 2.5 quintillion bytes of data are
created every day in the world, so much that 90% of the data
has been created in the last two years alone. The explosive
growth in the volume of data captured by the machines,
sensors and IoT etc. has changed our lifestyle gradually.
According to a prediction by IDC, data set will grow 10-fold
by the year of 2020 and there will be 5,200 GB of data for
every person on earth 1. Traditional storage model cannot
meet the people’s requirement due to the increasing large
amount of data, which leads to the emergence of cloud
storage.
As a basic service of IaaS (Infrastructure as a service)
model in cloud computing [1], cloud storage enables data
owners to store their files to the cloud and deletes the local
copy of the data, which dramatically reduces the burden of
maintenance and management of the data. Cloud storage
has a number of eye-catching features [2], say global data
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access, independent geographical locations, on demand self-
service, resource elasticity, etc. Currently, both the individu-
als and big companies are enjoying the benefits due to cloud
storage services.
Despite the benefits offered by cloud storage, there are
many inherent security risks since when data owners out-
source their data to the cloud, they generally lose physical
possession of their data and even have no idea where their
data are actually stored or who has the permission to getting
access to their data. That is to say, it is the cloud servers
who control the fate of the data after the data owners
uploading their files to the cloud. The cloud servers assure
they will try their best to protect the security of the cloud
data, but the data loss accidents are inevitable. This is not
surprising. Firstly, a short-time crash of the cloud server or
the breakdown of the storage medium(e.g RAM) will cause
the data easily corrupted. Moreover, users’ data may be lost
due to deliberate deletion by cloud servers in order to make
the available storage space for other files to get more profit.
A survey2 reported that 43% of the respondents had lost
their outsourced data and had to resort to recovering the
data from backups. Data loss incident happens frequently in
reality and has been regarded as one of the key security con-
cerns in cloud storage3. For example, Amazon’s cloud crash
disaster permanently destroyed many customers’ data. 4
It was reported that “the data loss was apparently small
relative to the total data stored, but anyone who runs a web
site can immediately understand how terrifying a prospect
any data loss is”. As a consequence, the data owners require
a strong integrity guarantee of their outsourced data and
2. http://datainsurance.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/A-CIS-
White-Paper-2013-4-4.pdf
3. http://blogs.idc.com/ie/?p=210
4. http://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-lost-data-2011-4
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they want to make sure that the cloud servers store their
data correctly. Therefore, cloud data integrity is of particular
importance in secure and reliable cloud storage.
To solve the aforementioned problems, Deswarte et al.
[3] proposed the concept of remote data integrity checking
(RDIC, is also known as data integrity auditing), which
comprises three parties, namely: cloud server, data owner
and third party auditor (TPA). A publicly verifiable RDIC
protocol allows the TPA or anyone to check the integrity of
the stored data on the cloud without the need to retrieve
the entire dataset. In 2007, Ateniese et al. [4], [5] proposed
a new notion of provable data possession (PDP) and gave
two efficient constructions using homomorphic verifiable
tag (HVT) based on RSA [6] algorithm. A HVT aggregates
response of the challenged blocks into a single value, which
significantly reduces the communication costs between the
server and the TPA. A year later in 2008, Shacham and
Waters [7] proposed the concept of proof of retrievability
(POR), as well as providing a construction based on short
signature algorithm [8] and proving its security in the
random oracle model. Since then, a number of remote data
integrity checking protocols have been proposed catering to
different real world requirements, such as dynamic opera-
tion [9], [10], [11], [12], privacy-preserving [13], [14], [15] and
publicly auditing [16], [17].
In the schemes discussed above, the data owner has a
pair of public/private keys (pk and sk respectively), where
sk is used to generate authenticators of blocks and pk is
used to verify a proof generated by the cloud server. In
other words, these systems are based on public key infras-
tructure (PKI), which involves a certificate authority (CA)
that issues and verifies digital certificates, a registration
authority that validates the identity of users requesting in-
formation from the CA, a central directory, and a certificate
management system. PKI based protocols have two key
limitations. Firstly, generation, management and revocation
of certificates is complex and computationally expensive,
and consequently scalability is challenging. Secondly, the
level of trust required of CA may be unrealistic, particularly
in light of recent high profile incidents. For example, in May
2015, a number of unauthorized digital certificates issued
by an Egyptian CA was uncovered, which can potentially
facilitate malicious attacks. 5
A popular alternative to PKI (and simplifying the com-
plex certificate management) is identity-based (ID-based)
cryptosystem [18] proposed by Shamir in 1984 which binds
the secret key to the user’s identity, without the need for a
digital certificate. Since then, a number of ID-based schemes
(including remote data auditing protocols) have been pro-
posed. Recently in 2015, for example, several ID-based
remote data auditing protocols were proposed [20], [21]
and in these protocols, identity information is an arbitrary
text string. The latter comprises user’s name, IP address
and E-mail address, which allows a user to register for a
private key corresponding to his identity from the private
key generation center. Although ID-based cryptosystems
resolve the need for complex certificate management, there
are a number of limitations inherent in such systems. For
5. http://www.pcworld.com/article/2901072/google-catches-bad-
digital-certificates-from-egyptian-company.html
example, the user’s identity may not be truly unique if
the identity information is not chosen properly (e.g. using
a common name such as “John Smith”). Secondly, a user
needs to “prove” to the private key generator centre that he
is indeed entitled to a claimed identity, such as presenting
a legal document supporting the claim. However, the sup-
porting documents are subject to forgery. Generally, both
ID-based and PKI-based schemes rely on what you know
(e.g. identity information) and what you have (e.g. digital
certificate and password).
Recently, fuzzy identity-based constructions [22], [23],
[24] are gaining popularity and the ideas of fuzzy theory
are involved in many applications [25], [26], [27]. Biometrics,
as a typical kind of fuzzy identity, are based on what you
are. In other words, biometric-based schemes authenticate
or identify a user based on one’s physiological or behavioral
features (e.g. fingerprint, iris and facial features) [28], [29]
and deployed in a number of real-world applications (e.g.
biometric passport and mobile devices such as Apple iOS
and Samsung phones). This is unsurprising, due to the
benefits offered by biometric-based schemes. For example,
biometric-based identities are easily portable and cannot be
forgotten or misplaced. Although there is potential for fuzzy
identity-based schemes to be used in cloud storage services,
we observe that there is no published fuzzy identity-based
data integrity auditing protocols for such services. This is,
perhaps, due to the challenges in establishing an optimal
error-tolerance for data integrity auditing protocols.
Our Contributions. In this paper, we seek to simplify
key management issue of remote data integrity auditing
protocols by introducing biometric-based identities in tra-
ditional RDIC protocols. We regard our contributions to be
three-fold.
1) We propose the notion of fuzzy identity-based data
integrity auditing designed to simplify key manage-
ment.
2) We then formalize the system model and security
model to ensure the security called soundness of this
new primitive (i.e. if a cloud server can convince a
verifier that the server is storing a file, if and only if
it is actually storing that file).
3) We describe a concrete construction of fuzzy
identity-based data integrity auditing protocol, by
borrowing the idea of fuzzy identity-based encryp-
tion due to Shacham and Waters [7]. The latter
employs “set overlap” distance metric to measure
the distance between two identity sets. We then
prove the security of the protocol in the selective-
ID security model, which relies on the Computa-
tional Diffie-Hellman and Discrete Logarithm as-
sumptions.
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as
follows. In the next section, we review the preliminaries
required in the understanding of the rest of the paper. We
describe the system model and security model in Section 3.
In Section 4, we present our construction of the biometric-
based data integrity auditing scheme, as well as analyzing
its correctness and efficiency. The security proof of the
proposed scheme is given in Section 5. Finally, we conclude
the paper in Section 6.
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2 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we review some preliminaries, including
bilinear maps, complexity assumptions and threshold secret
sharing scheme.
2.1 Bilinear Maps
Let G and GT denote two groups of the same prime
order p. A bilinear pairing e : G × G → GT is a map
satisfying the following properties [30]:
Bilinear: e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab, for all u, v ∈ G and all
a, b ∈ Zp.
Non-degenerate: e(g, g) 6= 1, where g is the generator of
G.
Computational: e(u, v) can be computed efficiently for
all u, v ∈ G.
2.2 Complexity Assumption
A. Computational Diffie-Hellmam(CDH) Assumption
[8]
G denotes a cycle group of a prime order p. Given the
tuple of (g, ga, gb) by the challenger, and the adversary A
attempts to output gab ∈ G. We say the adversary A has an
 advantage if
Pr[A(g, ga, gb) = gab] ≥ .
Definition 1. The (t, )-CDH assumption holds in G if no
t-time adversary has advantage at least  in solving the
problem above.
B. Discrete Logarithm(DL) Assumption [31]
The discrete logarithm is defined as follows. The adver-
sary A is given the tuple (g, ga), and attempts to output
a ∈ Zp. The adversary A has the advantage  in solving
discrete logarithm problem if
Pr[A(g, ga) = a] ≥ 
Definition 2. The (t, )-DL assumption holds in G if no
t-time adversary has advantage at least  in solving the
problem above.
2.3 Threshold Secret Sharing Scheme
Secret sharing schemes were proposed by Shamir [32]
which is used for storing important and sensitive informa-
tion. It divides a secret into several parts and distributes a
unique part, which we called a share of the secret, to each
participant in a group. The secret can be recovered by a
certain number of shares combining together. Threshold de-
notes the number which is sufficient for reconstructing the
secret. Specifically, a (t, n) threshold secret sharing scheme
includes n players P1, · · · , Pn and a dealer. Each player Pi
is distributed a secret share si(1 ≤ i ≤ n) by the dealer
respectively and each share should be kept confidential. Any
group of t or more players can reconstruct the secret s by
showing their shares. However, any group of players with
less than t players learns nothing about the secret. Shamir’s
secret sharing scheme is based on polynomial interpolation,
which takes t points to define a polynomial of degree t− 1.
Suppose a (t, n) threshold secret sharing scheme is to share
a secret s, the dealer first randomly chooses t − 1 integers
a1, · · · , at−1 and a polynomial f(x) of degree t − 1 such
that f(0) = s. f(x) can be defined as f(x) = s+
∑t−1
i=0 aix
i.
Then, the dealer picks some xi ∈ Zp, and distributes the
secret share si = f(xi) to each player Pi. If a set of players
S ⊂ P , where |S| ≥ t, wants to recover the secret s, they are
able to reconstruct f(x) by:
f(x) =
∑
Pi∈S
∆xi,s(x)si,
where
∆xi,s(x) =
∏
Pi∈S,j 6=i
x− xj
xi − xj
denotes the Lagrange coefficient.
2.4 Fuzzy Identity-based Signature
The notion of Fuzzy identity-based signature is the sig-
nature analog of fuzzy identity based encryption, which
was first proposed in [23]. It has the property of error
tolerance, which allows a user issuing a signature with the
identity ω and could be verified with another identity ω′ if
and only if they are within a certain distance. Thus, it can
provide biometric authentication. This primitive consists of
4 algorithms as follows,
• Setup(1k, d): This is a probabilistic algorithm which
takes a security parameter 1k and an error tolerance
d as input. It generates the master key mk as well as
the public parameter pp.
• Extract(msk, ID): This is a probabilistic algorithm
which takes a master key mk and an identity ID
as input. It generates the secret key DID as well as
the public parameter pp.
• Sign(pp,M,DID): This is a probabilistic algorithm
which takes the public parameter pp, a secret key
DID and a message M as input. It outputs the
signature σ.
• Verify (pp, ID′,M, σ): This is a deterministic algo-
rithm which takes the public parameter pp, an iden-
tity ID′ such that |ID ∩ ID′| ≥ d, the message M
and the signature σ as input. It returns 1 or 0 to prove
the signature is valid or not .
3 SYSTEM MODEL AND SECURITY MODEL
We now describe the system model and security model
for biometric-based data integrity auditing protocols.
3.1 System Model
A fuzzy identity-based data integrity auditing scheme
involves four entities, namely key generation centre (KGC),
cloud user, cloud server and TPA (see Fig.1). The KGC is
responsible for generating user’s secret key based on the
user’s identities, and a TPA is the trusted entity designated
to verify the cloud data’s integrity on behalf of the cloud
user upon request. The details of the biometric-based data
integrity auditing protocol are as follows.
1) A cloud user presents the fuzzy identity to the KGC.
2) The KGC measures the properties of the fuzzy iden-
tity, and then generates a private key for the cloud
user.
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3) Upon receiving the secret key from the KGC, the
cloud user is able to preprocess the file by generat-
ing metadata of the file, upload files together with
the metadata to the cloud, and delete the local copy
of the data.
4) Finally, both TPA and cloud server run a challenge-
response protocol for data integrity auditing to de-
termine if the stored data are intact.
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Fig. 1. The system model of fuzzy identity-based data integrity auditing
protocol
3.2 System components
More formally, a biometric-based data integrity auditing
protocol consists of the following six probabilistic algo-
rithms.
• Setup(1k,m, d). This algorithm is a probabilistic al-
gorithm run by the KGC. It takes a secure parameter
k, a maximum number of dimensions in a vector
that can describe a biometric-based identity m and
an error tolerance d as input. It outputs the public
parameters PP and the master secret key MK .
• Extract(PP,MK, ID). This algorithm is a probabilis-
tic algorithm run by the KGC. It takes the public
parameters PP , the master key MK and a user’s
identity ID as input. It outputs a private key Kw
corresponding to the identity ID.
• MetadataGen(PP,Kw, F ). This algorithm is a prob-
abilistic algorithm run by the data owner. It takes the
public parameters PP , the private key Kw and a file
F as input. It outputs the file tag τ , and a set of block
authenticators {σi} of the file blocks {mi}.
• Challenge(PP, τ, ID). This algorithm is a probabilis-
tic algorithm run by the TPA. It takes the public
parameters PP , the file tag τ and the data owner’s
biometric-based identity ID as input. It outputs a
challenge chal.
• Response(PP, F, {σi}, chal). This algorithm is a
probabilistic algorithm run by the cloud server. It
takes the public parameters PP , the file F , the block
authenticators {σi} and the challenge chal as input.
It outputs a respond resp to prove the possession of
the data.
• Verify(PP, ID′, chal, resp). This algorithm is a prob-
abilistic algorithm run by the TPA. It takes the public
parameters PP , the data owner’s new biometric-
based identity ID′, the challenge chal and the re-
sponse resp as input. It outputs an auditing result
result ∈ {0, 1} showing whether the cloud server
keeps the file F unchanged.
3.3 Security Requirements and Security Model
A fuzzy identity-based data integrity auditing protocol
needs to provide the following properties [7]
1) Correctness. Correctness states that a valid proof,
generated by the Response algorithm, can pass the
Verify algorithm with overwhelming probability.
2) Soundness. Soundness requires that, any cheating
prover, who can generate a valid proof that can
pass the Verify algorithm is actually storing the
challenged file. In other words, there is no adversary
who does not store the file can produce a valid proof
of the challenge.
We provide the following selective-ID security model
to make the notion of soundness more precisely. The
essence of the security model is there exists an extractor
Extr(PP, ID, τ, P ′), a polynomial time algorithm run by
the challenger. It takes the public parameters PP , the iden-
tity ID, the file tag τ and the cheating prover P ′ as input,
and can extract the file F . The game of soundness between
an adversary and a challenger is described below.
Initial. The adversary declares a target identity, α, to be
challenged upon.
Setup. The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and gets
the public parameters PP and the master key MK . Then it
forwards the PP to the adversary.
Queries. The adversary is allowed to make some queries
including the extract queries and the metadatagen queries.
• Extract queries. The adversary can make queries of
private keys for some identities γj , where |γj ∩ α|
should be less than d for all j.
• MetadataGen queries. The adversary can make
queries on the file tag for some file F , the challenger
runs the Extract algorithm to get the private keys
and runs the MetadataGen algorithm to obtain the
metadata of the file, and returns the metadata to the
adversary.
ProofGen. For the file F on which a MetadataGen query
has been made, the adversary can make an interaction with
the challenger following the challenge-response protocol by
specifying the identity ID and the file tag τ , where the ver-
ifier acts as the challenger. The adversary is provided with
an output of Verify algorithm when the protocol execution
completes.
Output. Finally, the adversary outputs a challenge tag
τ together with the target identity α chosen at the Initial
stage, and the description of a prover P ′.
The cheating prover P ′ now can interact with the verifier
by executing the protocols with the input of the challenge
tag τ , which is returned from file F ′, and the challenge
identity α. If it can convincingly answer an  fraction of the
challenges, we say the cheating prover P ′ is -admissible.
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Definition 1. An fuzzy identity-based data integrity
auditing protocol is -sound if there exists an adversary
playing the Setup algorithm and outputs an -admissible
cheating prover P ′ for a file F , then there exists an extrac-
tion algorithm that can recover the file F from P ′ with a
nonnegligible probability.
4 A CONCRETE CONSTRUCTION
In this section, we present a concrete construction of
fuzzy identity-based data integrity auditing protocol using a
biometric-based identity , e.g. fingerprint. We firstly present
the basic idea of our construction, and then describe the
concrete protocols in detail.
4.1 Basic idea
As shown in Fig.2, our biometric-based data integrity au-
diting protocol has three procedures, namely Enroll, Store
and Audit.
Biometric 1 Featurevector 1
Private
key
Response
Specialized
equipment KGCEnroll
Master key
File F File F* MetadataPreprocessStore
Biometric 2 Featurevector 2
Auditing
result
Audit Specialized
equipment
Fig. 2. Top view of biometric-based data integrity auditing protocols
• Enroll. It consists of the Setup and Extract algorithms.
Firstly, the KGC sets up the public parameters PP
and the master private key MK , and the cloud
server establishes the data storage service. The cloud
user, who is willing to enjoy the storage service, use
the biometric collection equipments, e.g., fingerprint
scanner, to obtain the biometric data α, which is a
feature vector, and sends them to the KGC. The KGC
extracts the private key Kw from the biometric data
α for the user using its master key MK .
• Store. The MetadataGen algorithm is executed in this
phase, in which the cloud user precesses the file F
to generate some metadata, including the file tag τ
and the block authenticators {σ(k)i }. Specifically, the
cloud user firstly computes a fuzzy identity-based
signature on the file name name and some parame-
ters n, u1, · · · , us to generate the file tag τ . Then, the
user splits the file F into n blocks {mi}1≤i≤n and
generates a block authenticator {σ(k)i }1≤i≤n,k∈ω for
each file block, which has the desirable homomor-
phism and allows the TPA to detect the corruption
of the file F in cloud without heavy communication
overhead.
• Audit. It is composed of the Challenge, Response and
Verify algorithms. In Challenge algorithm, the TPA
samples on the blocks of the file M to generate a
challenge chal and sends chal to the cloud server.
According to the challenge, the server generates
proof resp by aggregating the challenged blocks
and the corresponding authenticators in the Response
algorithm. Finally, the TPA verifies the response resp
to determine whether the file F is intact on the cloud.
4.2 Construction Description
The details of the protocol are as follows: Let G and GT
be two multiplicative cyclic groups of the same order p. g is
a generator of G. e : G × G → GT denotes a bilinear map.
We define Lagrange coefficient ∆i,S for i ∈ Zp and a set, S,
of element in Zp:
∆i,S =
∏
j∈S,j 6=i
x− j
i− j .
Setup(m, d). First choose g1 = gy, g2 ∈ G. Next, uni-
formly choose t1, · · · , tm+1 ∈ G at random. Let M be the
set {1, 2, · · · ,m + 1} where m is the maximum number of
attributes to describe a biometric-based identity. And we
define a function T as:
T (x) = g2
xm
m+1∏
i=1
ti
∆i,M (x).
Select a random integer z′ ∈ Zp, and compute v′ = gz′ . The
public parameters are PP = {g1, g2, t1, · · · , tm+1, v′, A =
e(g1, g2)}, and the master key is MK = y.
Extract(PP,MK,ω). To generate a private key for an
identity ω, where |ω| = m, the KGC first chooses a random
d−1 degree polynomial q such that q(0) = y. Then the KGC
calculates the private key corresponding to the identity ω as
Kw = ({Dk}k∈ω, {dk}k∈ω) where:
Dk = g
q(k)
2 T (k)
rk ,
dk = g
−rk .
where each rk(k ∈ ω) is a random number in Zp.
MetadataGen(Kw, F ). Given a file F , the data owner
firstly applies the erasure code to F and obtains F ′;
then splits F ′ into n blocks, each s sectors long:
F ∗ = {mij}1≤i≤n,1≤j≤s. Choose a name for a file from
Zp, s random elements u1, · · · , us ∈ G. Let τ0 =
name‖n‖u1‖ · · · ‖us. Then the file tag τ is τ0 together with a
fuzzy identity-based signature [23] on τ0: τ = τ0‖Sign(τ0).
For block i(1 ≤ i ≤ n), choose a random sk ∈ Zp for each
k ∈ ω, and generate a block authenticator for the i-th block
as follows:
σ
(k)
1i =
{
Dk ·
(
H(name‖i) · v′ ·
s∏
j=1
uj
mij
)sk}
k∈ω
σ
(k)
2i =
{
g−sk
}
k∈ω
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σ
(k)
3i =
{
g−rk
}
k∈ω
The data owner stores the file F ′, and the corresponding
metadata of the file including file tag together with the block
authenticators (τ, {σ(k)1i , σ(k)2i , σ(k)3i }1≤i≤n) on the cloud.
Challenge(PP, τ, w′). Upon receiving the auditing re-
quest from the cloud user with identity w′, the TPA checks
whether |ω ∩ ω′| ≥ d holds. If so, the TPA picks an l-
element subset I of the set [1, n], and for each i ∈ I , chooses
a random vi ∈ Zp. Let C be the set {(i, vi)}i∈I , the TPA
forwards the challenge C to the cloud server.
Response(F, τ, C, {σ(k)1i , σ(k)2i , σ(k)3i }1≤i≤n). Upon receiv-
ing the challenge C = {(i, vi)}i∈I from the TPA, the cloud
server generates a response in the following way,
µj =
∑
(i,vi)∈C
vimij ,
σ
(k)
1 = {
∏
(i,vi)∈C
σ
(k)
1i
vi}k∈ω,
σ
(k)
2 =
{
σ
(k)
2i
}
i∈C,k∈ω,
σ
(k)
3 =
{
σ
(k)
3i
}
i∈C,k∈ω.
and returns resp = (µ1, · · · , µs, σ(k)1 , σ(k)2 , σ(k)3 ) to the TPA.
Verify(resp, chal, ω′). Upon receiving the proof from the
server, the TPA chooses an arbitrary d-element subset S of
ω ∩ ω′, and verifies whether
∏
(i,vi)∈C
Avi
?
=
∏
k∈S
(
e(σ
(k)
1 , g) ·
∏
(i,vi)∈C
e
(
T (k), σ
(k)
3
vi
)
·
e
((
H(name‖i)v′
)vi s∏
j=1
uj
µj , σ
(k)
2
))∆k,S(0)
holds. If the equation holds, return 1, otherwise return 0.
Correctness. The correctness of the verification is
straightforward by the bilinear property of bilinear maps.
σ
(k)
1 =
∏
(i,vi)∈C
σi
vi
=
∏
(i,vi)∈C
(
Dk
(
H(name‖i)v′
s∏
j=1
uj
mij
)sk)vi
so we have
∏
k∈S
e(σ
(k)
1 , g) =
∏
k∈S
∏
(i,vi)∈C
e
(
Dk
vi , g
)
·
e
((
H(name‖i)v′
)vi s∏
j=1
uj
µj , gsk
))
=
∏
k∈S
∏
(i,vi)∈C
(
e
(
g2
q(k)T (k)
rk
)vi
, g
)
·
e
((
H(name‖i)v′
)vi s∏
j=1
uj
µj , gsk
))
=
∏
k∈S
∏
(i,vi)∈C
e
(
g2
q(k), gvi
)
e
(
T (k)
rk , gvi
)
·
e
((
H(name‖i)v′
)vi s∏
j=1
uj
µj , gsk
))
,
which means that∏
k∈S
(
e(σ
(k)
1 , g) ·
∏
(i,vi)∈C
e
(
T (k), σ
(k)
3
vi
)
·
e
((
H(name‖i)v′
)vi s∏
j=1
uj
µj , σ
(k)
2
))∆k,S(0)
=
∏
k∈S
∏
(i,vi)∈C
(
e
(
g2
q(k), g
)vi)∆k,S(0)
=
∏
(i,vi)∈C
e
(
g2, g
y
)vi
=
∏
(i,vi)∈C
Avi
so the equation in Verify algorithm holds.
5 SECURITY PROOFS
In this section, we prove that the biometric-based data
integrity auditing protocol achieves the property of sound-
ness. In other words, even if a cloud server exhibits arbitrary
dishonest behavior, the server must store the file with a high
probability provided that it generates a valid response for a
challenge of the file. The soundness of our construction is
concluded in the following theorem.
Theorem. If the fuzzy identity-based digital signature
algorithm employed for file tags is existentially unforgeable
and the CDH assumption is hard in bilinear groups, in the
random oracle model, except with negligible probability
no adversary against the soundness of our fuzzy identity-
based remote data integrity checking protocol can cause the
verifier to accept a response of a challenge instance, except
by generating values {µj} and {σ(k)1 , σ(k)2 , σ(k)3 } correctly,
i.e., as they computed in the Response algorithm in our
protocol.
We prove this theorem in a series of games.
Game 0. The first game, Game 0, is simply the challenge
game with a change for a publicly verifiable response de-
fined in Section 3.
Game 1. Game 1 is the same as Game 0, with one
difference. The challenger keeps a list of file tags issued as
the metadata of the outsourced data. If the adversary is able
to generate such a file tag t that (1) is valid under the Sign
algorithm but (2) is not a tag generated by the challenger,
the challenger aborts.
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It is clear that the difference in the adversary’s success
probability between Game 0 and Game 1 is the probability
that the adversary can break the fuzzy identity-based digital
signature scheme used for generating tags of a file.
Game 2. Game 2 is the same as Game 1, with one differ-
ence. The challenger keeps a list of responses to extraction
queries from the adversary. Now the challenger observes
each instance of the protocol, including key extraction, tag
generation, challenge-response and verification. If in any of
these instances the adversary is successful, that is, the Verify
algorithm outputs 1, but the private key for the identity w
in this instance is not generated by the extraction algorithm,
the challenger declares failure and aborts.
Clearly, the difference in the adversary’s success prob-
ability between Game 2 and Game 1 is the probability
that the adversary can forge a valid private key for an
identity w. With this in mind, we now demonstrate that if
there is a nonnegligible difference in the adversary’s success
probability between Game 2 and Game 1, we can construct a
simulator that can solve the Computational Diffie-Hellman
problem.
The simulator is given g, ga, gb as input, and is supposed
to output gab. The simulation runs as follows:
The adversary selects a random identity α to be chal-
lenged upon.
The simulator sets the public parameters as g1 =
ga, g2 = g
b. It then chooses a random polynomial of m
degree f(x) and another m degree polynomial such that
u(x)
{
= −xm, x ∈ α
6= −xm, others
the simulator sets ti = g
u(i)
2 g
f(i), for i from 1 to m. Then
we can compute Ti in the same way in construction: T (i) =
gi
m
2
m∏
i=1
ti
∆j,M(i) = gi
m
2
m∏
i=1
g
u(i)
2 g
f(i)
∆j,M(i)
= g
im+u(i)
2 g
f(i).
So we equivalently set T (i) as follows:
T (i) =
{
gf(i), x ∈ α
g
in+u(i)
2 g
f(i), others
Then the public parameters PP = (g, g1, g2, t1, · · · , tm+1,
A = e(g1, g2)), and the master secret key is a, which is
unknown to the simulator.
To answer the private key queries on identity γ, where
|γ ∩ α| is less than d, the simulator acts as follows. We first
define three sets, as shown in Fig. 1, Γ,Γ′, S, where Γ =
γ ∩ α, Γ′ is the set satisfying Γ ⊆ Γ′ ⊆ γ and |Γ′| = d − 1,
S = Γ′ ∪ 0 Then we set the private keys {Di, di}i∈γ as
follows:
1) For i ∈ Γ′, the private keys are set as:
Di = g2
λiT (i)ri , di = g
−ri
where λi, ri are randomly chosen in Zp.
2) For i ∈ γ − Γ′, the private keys are computed as
Di =
( ∏
j∈Γ′
g2
λj∆j,S(i)
)(
g1
−f(m)
im+u(i)
(
g2
im+u(i)gf(i)
)ri′)∆0.S(i)
di =
(
g1
1
im+u(i) g−ri
′
)∆i,S(0)
Fig. 3. Query sets
When i ∈ γ − Γ′, which indicates i /∈ α, u(i) 6= −im,
so im + u(x) will be non-zero. We claim the assignment is
identical to the original scheme from the adversaries view.
To observe this, we set ri = (r′i − aim+u(i) )∆0.S(i), then we
have
Di =
( ∏
j∈Γ′
g2
λj∆j,S(i)
)(
g1
−f(m)
im+u(i)
(
g2
im+u(i)gf(i)
)ri′)∆0,S(i)
=
( ∏
j∈Γ′
g2
λj∆j,S(i)
)(
g
−af(m)
im+u(i)
(
g2
im+u(i)gf(i)
)ri′)∆0,S(i)
=
( ∏
j∈Γ′
g2
λj∆j,S(i)
)
·
(
g2
a
(
g2
im+u(i)gf(i)
) −af(m)
im+u(i)
(
g2
im+u(i)gf(i)
)r′i)∆0.S(i)
=
( ∏
j∈Γ′
g2
λj∆j,S(i)
)(
g2
a
(
g2
im+u(i)gf(i)
)ri′− −af(n)im+u(i))∆0.S(i)
=
( ∏
j∈Γ′
g2
λj∆j,S(i)
)
g2
a∆0,S(i)(T (i))
ri
= g2
q(i)T (i)
ri
di =
(
g1
1
im+u(i) g−ri
′
)∆i,S(0)
=
(
g−(r
′
i− ain+u(i) )
)∆i,S(0)
= g−ri
Eventually, the adversary outputs a valid forgery of the
private keys kα = ({Di∗}, {di∗})i∈α for the identity α. The
simulator then can solve the CDH problem using the forgery
from the adversary. First, the simulator selects a random set
α∗ ⊆ α, where |α∗| = d, and computes as follows:
D∗ =
∏
i∈α∗
{Di∗}∆i,α∗ (i)
d∗ =
∏
i∈α∗
{di∗}∆i,α∗ (i)f(i)
Finally. the simulator can give the solution to the instance of
the CDH problem as
gab = D∗d∗
Therefore if there is a nonnegligible difference in the
adversary’s success probability between Game 2 and Game
1, we can construct a simulator that can solve the Computa-
tional Diffie-Hellman problem, as required.
Game 3. Game 3 is the same as Game 2, with one differ-
ence. The challenger keeps a list of responses to metadata
queries from the adversary. Now the challenger observes
each instance of the protocol, including key extraction,
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metadata generation, challenge-response and verification. If
in any of these instances the adversary is successful, that is,
the Verify algorithm outputs 1, but the adversary’s aggregate
authenticator is not equal to
σ
(k)
1 = {
∏
(i,vi)∈C
σ
(k)
1i
vi}k∈ω,
σ
(k)
2 = {
∏
(i,vi)∈C
g−si}k∈ω,
σ
(k)
3 = {
∏
(i,vi)∈C
g−ri}k∈ω,
the challenger declares failure and aborts.
We analyze the difference in success probabilities be-
tween Game 3 and Game 2. Suppose the file which
leads to abort has n blocks, with name name, has gen-
erated exponents {µj} and contains sectors {mij}, and
the block authenticators issued by Metadata generation
are {σ(k)1i , σ(k)2i , σ(k)3i }. Suppose C = {(i, vi)} is the query
that causes the challenger’s failure, and the adversary’s
response to that query was µ′1, µ
′
2, · · · , µ′s together with
σ
(k)
1
′
, σ
(k)
2
′
, σ
(k)
3
′
. The difference in success probabilities be-
tween Game 3 and Game 2 is forging a valid aggregate
authenticator for challenge C . With this in mind, we show
that if there is a nonnegligible difference in the adversary’s
success probability between Game 3 and Game 2, there is
another algorithm that can solve the Computational Diffie-
Hellman problem.
The simulator C is given as inputs an instance of the
Computational Diffie-Hellman problem (g, ga, gb), and its
goal is to output the value of gab. Assume the adversary
makes at most l  p metadata queries. The simulation
between the simulator C and the adversary A is as follows.
Setup: C picks a target identity α∗ and sets g1 = ga and
g2 = g
b. Then, C sets up the simulation as follows.
1) Select a random k ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n}.
2) Choose random values x′, x1, · · · , xs from
{0, 1, · · · , 2l − 1}.
3) Choose random z′, z1, · · · , zs from zp.
4) Find a random m degree polynomial f(x).
5) Define an m degree polynomial u(x) such that
u(x) = −xm if and only if x ∈ α∗.
6) For 1 ≤ k ≤ n+ 1, set tk = gu(k)2 gf(k)
Under this assignment, we have
T (k) = gk
n
2
n+1∏
j=1
(g
u(j)
2 g
f(j))δj,N (k) = g
kn+u(k)
2 g
f(k).
C publishes the public parameters of the system as(
g, g1, g2, t1, · · · , tn+1, v′ = gx
′−2kl
2 g
z′ ,
{uj = gxj2 gzj}1≤j≤s, A = e(g1, g2)
)
The simulator keeps a list of hash table. For each i(1 ≤
i ≤ n), the simulator picks a random ρi ∈ Zp and sets the
random oracle at i as
H(name‖i) = gρi
.
To respond a query on identity α∗ of a file M =
{mij}1≤i≤n,1≤j≤s, for the L-th block {mLj}1≤j≤s, we de-
fine
FL = −2lk + x′ +
s∑
j=1
xjmLj
and
JL = z
′ +
s∑
j=1
zjmLj .
If FL = 0 (mod p), C declares failure and aborts. Oth-
erwise, C chooses a set Θ ⊂ α∗, where |Θ| = d − 1
and for k ∈ Θ, defines gq′(k) = gλ′k in which λ′k are
random elements in Zp. For k ∈ α∗ \ Θ, C computes
gq
′(k) = (
∏d−1
j=1 g
λ′j∆j,α∗ (k))ga∆0,α∗ (k). For k ∈ α∗, C picks
random rLk , s
L
k ∈ Zp and computes
σ
(k)
1L = {(gq
′(k))
− JL+ρLFL gρLs
L
k+f(k)r
L
k (gJLgFL2 )
sLk }k∈α∗ ,
σ
(k)
2L = {g−r
L
k }k∈α∗ ,
σ
(k)
3L = {(gq
′(k))1/FLg−s
L
k }k∈α∗ .
It is straightforward to show that {σ(k)1L , σ(k)2L , σ(k)3L }k∈α∗
is a valid authenticator for the block L where the random
value sˆk = sk − q′(k)/FL. In this way, the simulator C is
able to simulate the authenticators for all the blocks.
Eventually, the adversary A outputs a valid authentica-
tor forgery S∗ = {σ(k)1i
∗
, σ
(k)
2i
∗
, σ
(k)
3i
∗}k∈α∗,1≤i≤n on file F ∗
for the identity α∗.
Assume FL
∗ = −2lk + x′ + ∑sj=1 xjm∗Lj and JL∗ =
z′ +
∑s
j=1 zjm
∗
Lj . If |γ ∩ α∗| ≥ d or if F ∗ 6= 0 (mod p),
C aborts. Otherwise, the L-th block authenticator forgery is
{σ(k)1L
∗
, σ
(k)
2L
∗
, σ
(k)
3L
∗}k∈α∗
Now the challenger C selects a random set Θ∗ ⊂ α∗ and
|Θ∗| = d, and computes as follows:
σ
(k)
1
∗
=
∏
k∈Θ∗
(
S1L
∗
)∆k,α(0)
,
σ
(k)
2
∗
=
∏
k∈Θ∗
(
S2L
∗
)∆k,α(0)f(k)
,
σ
(k)
3
∗
=
∏
k∈Θ∗
(
S3L
∗
)∆i,α(0)
.
Then C can solve the CDH problem problem by computing
σ
(k)
1
∗ · σ(k)2
∗ · (σ(k)3 ∗)ρL∗J∗ = gab
Game 4. Game 4 is the same as Game 3, with one
difference. As before, the challenger keeps a list of re-
sponses to metadata queries from the adversary. Now the
challenger observes each instance of the protocol, includ-
ing key extraction, metadata generation, challenge-response
and verification. If in any of these instances the adversary
is successful, that is, the Verify algorithm outputs 1, but
at least one of the aggregate messages µj is not equal to∑
(i,vi)∈C vimij , where C is the challenge issued by the
verifier, the challenger declares failure and aborts.
Again, we analyze the difference in success proba-
bilities between Game 3 and Game 2. Suppose the file
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which leads to abort has n blocks, with name name,
has generated exponents {µj} and contains sectors {mij},
and the block authenticators issued by Metadata gener-
ation are {σ(k)1i , σ(k)2i , σ(k)3i }. Suppose C = {(i, vi)} is the
query that causes the challenger’s failure, and the adver-
sary’s response to that query was µ′1, · · · , µ′s together with
σ
(k)
1
′
, σ
(k)
2
′
, σ
(k)
3
′
. Let the expected response be µ1, · · · , µs
and {σ(k)1 , σ(k)2 , σ(k)3 }, in which
µj =
∑
(i,vi)∈C
vimij ,
σ
(k)
1 =
{ ∏
(i,vi)∈C
σ
(k)
1i
vi
}
k∈ω
,
σ
(k)
2 =
{
σ
(k)
2i
}
i∈C,k∈ω,
σ
(k)
3 =
{
σ
(k)
3i
}
i∈C,k∈ω.
Game 3 already guarantees that the authenticators of all the
blocks are equal, and it is only the values µ′j and µj that can
be different. Define ∆µj = µ′j − µj for 1 ≤ j ≤ s, there is
at least one ∆µj whose value is not zero since at least one
of the aggregate messages µj is not equal to the expected
value.
We show that if there is a nonnegligible difference in the
adversary’s success probability between Game 4 and Game
3, there is another algorithm that can solve the the discrete
logarithm problem. The simulator S is given g, h ∈ G, and
its goal is to output x such that h = gx. S behaves like the
Game 3 challenger, with the following differences.
1) When being asked to generate the metadata of the
file with n blocks {mij}, S picks two random values
βj , γj and sets uj = gβjhγj .
2) S continues interacting with the adversary until the
specified condition of Game 3 occurs.
Since the authenticators of all the blocks are equal and
both the responses are valid, we have∏
S
e(σ
(k)
1 , g) =
∏
S
∏
(i,vi)∈C
e
(
g2
q(i), gvi
)
e
(
T (i)
ri , gvi
)
·
e
((
H(name‖i)v′
)vi
, gsi
)
e
( s∏
j=1
uj
µj , gsk
)
and∏
S
e(σ
(k)
1 , g) =
∏
S
∏
(i,vi)∈C
e
(
g2
q(i), gvi
)
e
(
T (i)
ri , gvi
)
·
e
((
H(name‖i)v′
)vi
, gsi
)
e
( s∏
j=1
uj
µ′j , gsk
)
Therefore, we can get
s∏
j=1
uj
µj =
s∏
j=1
uj
µ′j .
Since uj = gβjhγj , we have
g
∑s
j=1βj∆µjh
∑s
j=1γj∆µj = 1.
Because there is at least one of the {∆µj} is nonzero,
finally, we get the solution to the given instance of discrete
logarithm as follows,
h = g
−
∑s
j=1βj∆µj∑s
j=1
γj∆µj .
Wrapping up. In Game 4, the adversary is constrained
from generating a response to a challenge other than those
that would have been generated by the Response algorithm
specified in Section 4. Yet we have shown that, assum-
ing the employed fuzzy identity-based signature algorithm
is unforgeable, say the scheme in [23], and computation
Diffie-Hellman problem and discrete logarithm problem are
intractable in bilinear groups, there is only a negligible
difference in the success probability of the adversary in
Game 4 compared with Game 1, where the adversary is not
constrained in this manner. This completes the proof of this
Theorem.
6 IMPLEMENTATION
All the algorithm in this implementation was conducted
on a 64-bit PC with Intel Core (TM) i5 - 4300 CPU @ 2.13GHz
and 8.0 GB RAM. All the projects were written in the C++
language using the Visual Studio 2010 compiler with the
assistance of the MIRACL library [33], which is widely
regarded as the gold standard open source for elliptic curve
cryptography. To make the implementation of our protocol
more general, we implement it with an asymmetric bilinear
map, e : G1 × G2 → GT , which is more efficient than
the symmetric ones in practice. For the asymmetric map
in MIRACL library, the ate pairing is always used. We fix
the security level of our protocol as λ = 80, and the Cock-
Pinch curve [34] as y2 = x3 − 3x + B (mod p) is chosen,
where p is a 2λ-bit prime, i.e. 160 bits. To capture the
biometric-based identity(e.g. fingerprints) as an input, we
use an optical fingerprint sensor to collect the information.
We set the acquisition rate to be 24 frames per second which
is to ensure the real-time performance of human-computer
interaction. We will show the implementation results from
the following four aspects.
In the first part, we show the time cost of the Setup and
Extract algorithms. We can learn from Fig. 4 that the time
consumption of Setup grows linearly with m, the maximum
number of attributes to describe an identity in the protocol.
This is reasonable because the function T needs to perform
m multiplications when generating the public parameters.
Fig. 5 shows that the time cost in Extract algorithm grows
linearly with the increment of the number of attributes.
This is consistent with the empirical analysis since a user’s
private key is calculated for each attribute of an identity.
In the second part, we would like to see the time cost to
generate metadata for a file of fixed size with the increasing
of block size. We fix the file as 1 MB, and select m, the
maximum number of attributes, as 10 and use 3 attributes
to describe the identity of a user. We increase the block size
from 1 KB to 100 KB with the increment of 10 KB for each
step. The result is reported in Fig. 6. As one shall see, it takes
about 157 seconds in the on-line phase to generate metadata
for the file, however, the time cost of the off-line phase
grows almost linearly with the increasing of the block size.
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This is in accordance with the analysis of the MetadataGen
algorithm because the sector has a constant size (160 bits),
and thus, for a file of fixed size, the total number of sectors
is a constant. This leads to the computation of
∏s
j=1 uj
mij
is constant in the on-line line phase regardless of the block
size.
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Fig. 4. Time consumption for Setup algorithm
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Extract
Fig. 5. Time consumption for Extract algorithm
In the third part, we try to determine the optimal block
size by analyzing the tradeoff of the time cost between
MetadataGen and Audit algorithm. With the increase of
block size, the number of sectors increases as well (sector
size is a constant). This will result in the increase of the
computational cost of
∏s
j=1 uj
mij in the MetadataGen algo-
rithm. However, the number of the blocks decreases when
the block size increases, which leads to less time consump-
tion since fewer σ(k)1 , σ
(k)
2 and σ
(k)
3 need to be calculated in
Response and verified in Verify (Note that, we challenge all
the blocks in the example). The tradeoff in Fig. 7 indicates
that the protocol has the best performance when the block
size is between 8 KB and 10 KB. We choose 10 KB as the
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180
Block size(KB)
Ti
m
e(s
)
 
 
MetadataGen−offline
MetadataGen−online
Fig. 6. Time consumption for MetadataGen algorithm of 1MB file
optimal block size to minimum the user’s computational
cost. When the block size is of 10 KB, the time cost of Setup,
Extract and MetadataGen is 0.703 second, 0.041 second and
173 seconds respectively.
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Block size(KB)
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m
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MetadataGen
Audit
Fig. 7. Tradeoff between MetadataGen and Audit for 1MB file
In the fourth part, we choose a file of 10, 000 blocks with
each block size 10 KB to test the performance of the server
and the TPA by increasing the number of challenged blocks
from 100 to 800, with the increment of 100 for each step.
We can see from Fig. 8 that both the server and the TPA’s
cost grows with the increasing of the number of challenged
blocks linearly. According to the observation due to Ateniese
et al. [4], if 1% of the entire blocks have been corrupted,
300 and 460 blocks out of 10, 000 blocks can be challenged
by the TPA to detect the misbehavior of the server with
the probability of 95% and 99%, respectively. We can see
that it costs the TPA 997.3 milliseconds and the server
9.071 seconds when challenging 300 blocks, while when
challenging 460 blocks, it costs the TPA 1.324 seconds and
the server 12.938 seconds. The implementation results show
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that our protocol is very efficient for both the server and the
TPA.
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
0
5
10
15
20
25
Number of challenged blocks
Ti
m
e(s
)
 
 
server cost
TPA cost
Fig. 8. Challenged blocks for a file of 10000 blocks
7 CONCLUSION
Cloud storage services have become an increasingly
important part of the information technology industry in
recent years. With more users getting involved in cloud stor-
age, ensuring the integrity of data outsourced to the cloud
is of paramount importance. In this paper, we presented the
first fuzzy identity-based data integrity auditing protocol.
The proposed protocol revolutionizes key management in
traditional remote data integrity checking protocols. We
also presented the the system and security models for this
primitive, and a concrete fuzzy identity-based data integrity
auditing protocol using the biometric-based identity as an
input. We then demonstrated the security of the protocol
in the selective-ID model. The prototype implementation of
the protocol demonstrates the practicality of the proposal.
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